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   This paper examines  the effects of temporary protection in  a model of  international
Cournot competition under the learning curve.   We show that when the protected firm can
choose among multiple technologies subject to different scopes for learning, the positive
relationship between current production and learning cannot be relied upon.  The protection
may hurt the long-run competitiveness of the domestic firm, decreasing its future sales both
in the home market and in the foreign market.
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I.  Introduction
Suppose we have a typist who works for predetermined wages.  He has been
using a word-processing software, of which he now is a master.  He is considering
switching to a new one.  The new one has a greater productive potential.  However,
adopting  it will reduce his productivity  temporarily because he has to look up help
whenever he performs a new task.  Only when he becomes sufficiently experienced
will he be able to realize its potential advantage.  Thus, to assess the desirability of a
switch, he has to weigh the benefit of enhanced productivity in the long run against the
cost of reduced productivity in the short run.
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Suppose he experiences a temporary surge in his work load.  Will it increase his
incentive to switch?  With more pages to type, he has more opportunity for learning
the new software. The long-run benefit of adopting the new software increases.
However, his work load now is concentrated on the current period, during which he is
more productive with the old software than with the new software.  This raises the
short-run cost of switching to the new software.  The answer to the question would
depend on which of the two effects dominates.
International economics has a long history of analyzing the relationship between
protection and learning.  A typical assumption made is that higher output now reduces
the cost of production later as a producer acquires additional knowledge through
experience.  Thus, protection, even when it is only  temporary, enhances the long-run
competitiveness of protected firms by boosting up their production now.  At the center
of the  time-honored and influential argument for infant industry protection lies this
crucial nexus between production and learning.
An implicit assumption underlying infant industry protection is that firms in the
protecting country have a lot to learn from using the current technology.  This
assumption would be valid in cases where the protected industry is entirely new to the
protecting country.  However, as for many industrializing countries seeking a rationale
for temporary protection or delayed liberalization, the assumption is often questionable.
Frequently, the industry in question has been there and domestic firms have been using
the current technology for some time, even though it is less efficient than the one used
by their foreign competitors.    This is also true in the case of advanced countries that
are  considering temporary protection to earn time to catch up with their foreign
competitors.    In this situation, protected firms may have little to learn from producing
more with the current technology.
This paper argues that the relationship between production and learning is non-
monotonic in the presence of multiple technologies subject to differential scopes for3
learning.  The argument rests on the following assumptions.  Firms have little to learn
from repeating the current production process.  Only with a new technology will
practice and experience generate a significant amount of learning.  However, a  new
technology, though it has a greater productive potential, initially is inferior to the older
one.
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We explore the implications of these assumptions for the effects of temporary
protection in a model of international Cournot duopoly.  The model is similar to the
two-period models of learning-by-doing presented by Spence (1981) and Fudenberg and
Tirole (1983).  The difference is that we  consider the choice of technology
simultaneously with learning in an infant-industry setting.   A foreign firm is using a
new technology whose productive potential has already reached a maximum.  A
domestic firm faces a choice between  an old technology with its learning potential
exhausted and a new technology with a steep learning curve, but initially inferior to the
older one.
In this setting, we show that protection imposed only for period 1 can reduce the
protected firm’s incentive to adopt the new technology.  Just as in the typist example
above, the temporary surge in demand caused by protection makes the new technology
more attractive as it allows the firm to learn faster about the new technology.
However, it also raises the relative importance of having low costs now compared to
having low costs in the future, making the new technology less attractive.  If the latter
effect dominates, temporary protection increases the firm’s incentive to stick to the old
technology, while it stimulates current output.
The argument of this paper, on several aspects, is reminiscent of the case against
infant-industry protection made by Baldwin (1969), who argues that protection is an
ineffective means of stimulating learning in the presence of problems in appropriating
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knowledge.  Recently, Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995, 1999) demonstrate the possibility
that temporary protection delays innovations when credibility problems exist regarding
the duration of protection.  This paper differs from these studies in that our argument
has no relation with the appropriation or the credibility problem.
The specification of technology adopted by this paper is closely related to the
recent literature on endogenous growth theory (Young 1993, Lucas 1993 and Parente
1994).  These papers examine the interactions between learning and technology
adoption under the assumption that any given technology has bounded productivity and
a switch of technologies temporarily reduces human capital.  However, these papers
suggest that an increase in the market size speeds up technological progress, ignoring
the possible negative relationship between production and learning.  The model closest
in spirit is that of Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996).  In a one-agent Bayesian model, they
show the possibility that an agent who is so experienced in the current technology will
never switch, while an agent who is less experienced will keep switching to better
technologies.  In this paper, too much protection replaces the role of too much
experience in their model.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents the model.    Section III
discusses possible extensions.  Section IV concludes.
II.  The Model
There are two firms competing in a home market -- one is domestic and the other
is  foreign.
3  The two firms produce a homogenous good and engage in Cournot
competition over two periods.  The inverse demand function of the market is given by
p(z), where z is industry output.  p(z) is continuously differentiable and p’(z) < 0.
There are two CRS technologies available for the industry -- one is old and the
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other is new.  The foreign firm has been using the new technology for some time, and
as in most analyses of an infant industry, we assume that its learning has ceased.  Thus
its unit cost is fixed at c* for both periods.  In contrast, the domestic firm has been
producing with the old technology.  If it continues to use to the old technology in
period 1 , the unit cost is given by  - c  for both periods.  If it  switches to the new
technology in period 1, paying the fixed price of F, the unit cost in period 1 is given by
c, which is greater than - c.  The firm can now learn from experience and the unit cost in
period 2 decreases as it produces more in period 1.  This relationship is represented by
the learning curve l(x), where x is the output in period 1 and l(x) is the unit cost in
period 2.  Naturally,  l(0) = c and l’(x) < 0.  I will assume that l”(x) > 0 and  l(x)
approaches a positive number strictly less than - c as x approaches infinity.  The learning
has diminishing returns and is bounded.
The game will proceed as follows.  In each period, each firm simultaneously
chooses a technology and output.
4  The foreign firm always uses the new technology.
The domestic firm has to decide on whether to produce with the old technology or with
the new one.
5  If it uses the old technology in period 1, then it will continue to use the
old one in period 2.  If it adopts the new technology in period 1, it will continue to use
the new one in period 2 on the condition that l(x) is less than  - c.
6  We will solve the
game for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction.
For the second-period game, note that the outcome depends on the unit costs of
the two firms, which are predetermined in period 1.  Since the unit cost of the foreign
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  In the following, I will assume that this condition is always met.  If not, the firm never adopts the
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firm is fixed at c*, we can express the profit of the domestic firm in period 2 as p2(c2)
7,
where c2 is the unit cost of the domestic firm in period 2 and p2 is decreasing in c2.
Now, go to the first period game.  Suppose the domestic firm expects that the
foreign firm will produce y in period 1.  For the old technology, the domestic  firm




 (p(x+y) - - c) x + p2(- c). (1)
I will use bars to denote quantities associated with the old technology.  For the new
technology, the domestic firm solves the following problem.
V(y) ” Max
x
  ( p(x+y) - c) x + p2(l(x)). (2)
The domestic firm will adopt the new technology if and only if V(y) - 
_
V(y) ‡ F.
From equation (1), the first order condition for maximizing 
_
V is given by
p(x+y) + p’(x+y) x = - c. (3)
This equation implicitly defines the best response of x under the old technology as a
function of y.  Let us denote this function as - r(y).  From equation (2), the first order
condition for maximizing V is given by
p(x+y) + p’(x+y) x = c - p2’(l(x)) l’(x). (4)
The marginal revenue is equated to the dynamic marginal cost, which is equal to the
current  marginal cost less the increase in the second-period profit due to additional
††††††††††††
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learning.  We will denote the dynamic marginal cost by ~ c(x).  Equation (4) defines
the best response of x under the new technology, which will be expressed by r(y).
To guarantee the optimality of the response functions, let us impose the following
second-order conditions.  As usual in the analysis of Cournot competition,
p’(x+y) + 2 p”(x+y) x < 0, (5)
p’(x+y) + p”(x+y) x < 0 (6)
for all non-negative x and y.  In other words, the marginal revenue curve is downward
sloping and it shifts to the left when the rival’s output increases.  The parallel
assumption is also made for the foreign firm.  In addition, we assume that
 ~ c’(x) > 0. (7)
The dynamic marginal cost is increasing in x.  The increases in the future profit due to
additional learning are diminishing.
8  The new technology will never be adopted if  ~ c
(0) is greater than  - c.  In addition, as x increases and the learning approaches a limit, ~ c
(x) goes to c.  This property of ~ c(x) is illustrated in figure 1.
The analysis of the game can be divided into several possible cases, depending
on the relative sizes of the market and the unit costs.  To avoid being typological, I will
focus on the most interesting one.  The other cases can be easily worked out using the
same method.  Suppose the market is sufficiently large that the marginal revenue curve
of the domestic firm corresponding to a sufficiently low value of y, say y0, is located at
MR(y0) in the lower panel of figure 1.  The marginal effect of learning is low and ~ c(x)
is above - c.   T hus r(y0) < - r(y0).  As y increases, the marginal revenue curve shifts to
the left and both r and - r decrease.  At y1, the marginal revue curve passes through the
††††††††††††
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Figure 1
Diminishing Marginal Learning
intersection point of ~ c(x) and - c, and r(y1) = - r(y1).  If y increases further to y2, then the
marginal effect of learning becomes high, making ~ c(x) less than - c.   Thus r(y2) > - r(y2).
These responses of the domestic firm are traced out in the upper panel of figure 2.
To see how the incentive for adopting the new technology changes as y changes,
let us define D(y) as V(y) - 
_
V(y).  Differentiating D(y) with respect to y,
D’(y) = V’(y) - 
_
V’(y)
= p’(r(y)+y) r(y) - p’(- r(y)+y) - r(y).
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Figure 2
The Choice of Technology
decreasing in x.  Thus, D’(y) exceeds 0 if and only if r(y) < - r(y).  The lower panel of
figure 2 shows how D(y) depends on y.
Now we derive the global response of the domestic firm.  The domestic firm
chooses the new technology if and only if D(y) is greater than F.  An interesting case is10
illustrated in the lower panel of figure 2.  At this value of F, the domestic firm chooses
the new technology for y  ˛ [y0, y2].  Thus, r(y) is the best response in this range.
Outside this range,  - r(y) is the best response.  Thus, the best response curve of the
domestic firm is given by the bold curve in the upper panel of figure 2.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is determined at the intersection point of the
domestic best response curve and a foreign best response curve.  (As is obvious from
figure 2, there is a possibility of multiple equilibria.)  Suppose that the unit cost of the
foreign firm is so low that the foreign best response R(x) is located at the far right in the
upper panel of figure 2.  Under free trade, the domestic firm chooses the old
technology.  Suppose the government imposes a binding quota only for period 1.
The foreign best response curve becomes kinked at the level of the quota, which I will
call q.
9  As long as q is greater than y2, the domestic firm chooses the old technology.
In this range of q, a temporary quota does not affect the outcome in period 2.  It just
decreases the output of the foreign firm and increases that of the domestic firm in period
1.  If q is less than y2, the domestic firm switches to the new technology.  Now the
quota has repercussions in period 2.  As the domestic firm’s unit cost decreases from - c
to l(r(q)) in period 2, the output of the foreign firm falls and that of the domestic firm
rises in period 2,  when there is no more protection.  The temporary  protection
increases the future competitiveness of the domestic firm and decreases future imports.
However, we can easily have the opposite results.  Suppose the position of the
foreign best response curve is such that the equilibrium output of the foreign firm under
free trade is between y0 and y2.  The domestic firm selects the new technology under
free trade.  However, if the government imposes a temporary quota whose level is
below y0, the domestic firm selects the old technology.  The second-period unit cost of
the domestic firm under the protection is given by  - c, which is higher that the one that
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would have prevailed under free trade.  The temporary protection decreases the long-
run competitiveness of the domestic firm even though it increases the current output of
the domestic firm.  It lowers future domestic market shares and  increases future
imports.
III. Some Remarks
1.  The Multi-market competition
The model of section II can be extended to the case where firms sell both in the
home market and in the foreign market.  A natural framework for the analysis is the
reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983).  In this model, each firm
plays Cournot with its rival in the home and the foreign market that are  mutually
segmented.
Despite the increased complexity, we can show that most results in the previous
section carry over.  If the level of protection is modest, a temporary import protection
induces the domestic firm to learn more in period 1 and enables it to expand the market
shares in period 2, now both in the home and the foreign market.  Note that t his
corresponds to  the  case examined by Krugman (1984), who shows that import
protection promotes export in the presence of  learning-by-doing.  However, in our
model, temporary protection can easily have the opposite results.  If the level of
protection is excessive, a temporary protection moves the market equilibrium from the
one where the domestic firm adopts the new technology to the one where it sticks to the
old technology.   In this case, temporary import protection decreases future exports and
increase future imports.
2.  The operation of multiple technologies
Allowing the domestic firm to use the two technologies simultaneously change the
results somewhat.  Suppose the domestic firm is producing both from an old
production line and from a new production line embedding a new technology.  To12
maximize the profit, the firm allocates total production between the two lines such that
the dynamic marginal cost of the new line is equated to the constant marginal cost of the
old line.  In this case, a temporary protection increases the total output of the domestic
firm, but fails to stimulate production from the new line.  The domestic firm meets the
increased demand simply by producing more from the old line, keeping the dynamic
marginal cost of the new line constant.  Protection fails to generate additional learning.
3.  The case where both technologies are subject to learning
We have made a polar assumption that an old technology has absolutely no scope
for additional learning while a new one has a downward sloping learning curve.  This
assumption is not essential for the result.
Suppose that the domestic firm faces a c hoice between technology 1 and
technology 2.  Both technologies have learning curves that are downward sloping and
bounded from below.  At the current level of experience, the unit cost of technology 2
is higher than that of technology 1.  However, the learning curve for technology 2
initially is much steeper than that for technology 1 and thus the former falls below the
latter at a sufficiently high level of production.  Then, we can easily have a case where
the dynamic marginal cost of technology 2 is lower than that of technology 1 for low
levels of production, but the reverse is true for high levels of production.  This leads to
exactly the same situation as depicted in figure 2.
4.  Price versus quantity competition
The main result of this paper is not sensitive to the choice of strategy variables.
To see this, suppose that the domestic firm and the foreign firm sell differentiated13
products and compete in prices.
10  The resulting model of Bertrand competition is
different from the Cournot model in two aspects.  Firstly, the best response curves
have positive slopes (prices are strategic complements).  Secondly, the best response
curve of the foreign firm depends on which technology it expects the domestic firm to
use.  Given the price charged by the domestic firm, the foreign firm charges a lower
price when it expects the domestic firm to use the new technology in order to
discourage the learning of the domestic firm.
However, the other aspects of competition remain identical.  It is easy to identify
a case where the domestic firm selects the new technology only when the price charged
by the foreign firm lies in a certain interval.  Temporary tariff protection shifts out the
best response curves of the foreign firm, increasing the equilibrium prices.
11  A
sufficiently high level of tariff will push the price charged by the foreign firm out of the
interval, inducing the domestic firm to select the old technology.
5.  Welfare, Information and Protection
In this model of dynamic Cournot competition, it is very difficult to establish the
general welfare effect of temporary protection.  Thus, this paper does not argue that a
temporary protection that induces the domestic firm to stick to the old technology is
necessarily welfare-reducing.
The governments in the real world have to decide on measures of protection, with
very limited information about their welfare consequences.  The justification most
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often cited by those pushing for learning-inducing protection is that while consumers
may have to sacrifice during the period of protection, domestic firms will become more
competitive and consumers will be compensated “in the long run.”  The point of the
paper is that these ‘long-run oriented’ policies may fail to deliver the desired long-run
outcomes, let alone their impacts on social welfare.
General output subsidy does not solve the problem either.  What is needed is
subsidy targeted for a specific technology.  This looks rather easy in our model, where
the domestic firm has only two technologies available.  However, the information
requirement for the government would in general be very high when it faces a whole
range of technologies to choose from.
  12  Designing a truth-telling non-linear subsidy
mechanism is a possibility, but it too requires detailed information on available
technologies and the market structure, which is hard to come by.
V.  Conclusion
This paper shows that temporary protection or delayed liberalization can harm the
long-run competitiveness of the domestic firm.  When the protected firm can choose
among multiple technologies subject to different degrees of learning, the positive
relationship between current production and learning commonly assumed in literature
cannot be relied upon.
This result has been obtained though a highly stylized model.  For example, our
two-period model predicts that the firm that does  not switch today never switches
tomorrow.  This restrictive outcome can certainly be avoided in a muti-period model.
However, this paper suggests that in such a model too would remain a force by which
temporary protection delays the adoption of new technologies.
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